If the agreement is indeed an important step forward for Canada`s relations with China, it is difficult to understand why it is shrouded in secrecy, why it has not been ratified for almost two years, and why there has been no attempt to answer questions with something that goes far beyond air insurance that it is a good thing. On paper, the new foreign investment law is expected to expand foreign investors` access to China (Articles 4, 16, 17) and improve the protection of their intellectual property (Articles 22, 23, 26 and 39). In this context, the language of Article 22 on forced technology transfer is important as it expresses Beijing`s message to the world that China, as an honest broker, is open to trade and investment, while underspeaking the growing importance of technology in today`s geopolitics. Article 22 of the new law, which prohibits the forced transfer of technology by administrative authorities or staff, is a direct response to concerns expressed by foreign investors for years because they are forced to divest themselves of their intellectual property. According to a 2018 Wall Street Journal article, China`s tactic for forced technology transfer included « pressure on U.S. partners in joint ventures to abandon technology, use local courts to invalidate U.S. companies` patents and licensing agreements, send cartels and other investigators, and submit regulatory bodies with experts capable of passing on trade secrets to Chinese competitors. » The new law directly addresses the subject. 97 Cf. Canada`s FIPP with Costa Rica (Annex I (VI) (1)- (2)); Croatia (Annex I, point VI, points 1 to 2); Ecuador (Article II, points 4(a) to (b)); Egypt (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Latvia (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Panama (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Philippines (art. II(4)- (5)); Romania (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Trinidad and Tobago (Article II, points 4(a) to (b)); Ukraine (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Uruguay (Annex I, point VI, points 1 to 2); and Venezuela (Annex II, points 3(a) to (b)). see Annex 2 to this article; Relevant contractual texts available online: DFATD . For China, the « national security review » may include a review of different forms of investment for national security purposes. On the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the specific legal document on China`s National Security Review is the Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment by Foreign Investors of the Security Screening System for the Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises, which focuses on the review of mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors.
115 Rpc FIPPA, a.a., note 2, Article 8(1)(b) (the most general elimination treatment does not apply to `treatment granted under a bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force before 1 January 1994`). Most-favoured-nation also does not cover trade agreements (China FIPPA, Ibid., Article 8(1)(a)(i)), but this does not affect this analysis, since the express application of most-favoured-nation treatment to FIPP after 1993 is sufficient to undermine Canada`s restrictive language after 2001 (provided that before 2001, language offers more favourable treatment to foreign investors than post-2001 language). China`s new foreign investment law certainly shows China`s willingness to tackle issues that affect foreign investors – and the wider international community. But will the intention translate into real and positive change? 99 (c.B the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can TS 1999 No. 31, Annex I, Section VI, point 1 (in force on 2 June 1999): « Decisions of a Party on whether or not the creation of a new entity is permitted, or the acquisition of an existing enterprise or an interest in that enterprise by investors or potential investors of the other party is not subject to dispute settlement [i.e. .